DNS over HTTPS (DoH) sends your DNS lookups inside an encrypted HTTPS connection, so the network in between can neither read nor rewrite the answers.
Explanation
Ordinary DNS is plain text on port 53. Your ISP can see every name you look up and can answer with whatever it likes. DoH, standardised as RFC 8484 in 2018, wraps the same question in HTTPS and sends it to a resolver you choose, such as Cloudflare at 1.1.1.1 or Google at 8.8.8.8. To the network it looks like ordinary encrypted web traffic on port 443. Firefox, Chrome, Edge and Windows 11 all support it. It is a direct fix for the most common block in OONI's data: an ISP replying with a fake address. Examples are Iran's 10.10.34.36 answer for vimeo.com on Mobinnet in October 2026 and TurkNet's 195.175.254.2 for YouTube in September 2025. DoH changes nothing else. Your browser still names the site in the TLS handshake (the SNI field), so a network that filters by SNI, or by the site's IP address, still cuts the connection after the lookup succeeds. Some networks also block well-known DoH resolvers. DoH protects the lookup; a web proxy or VPN changes the connection itself.
In practice
Which block DoH beats is visible in OONI's raw data. On 14 Oct 2026 an Iranian probe on Mobinnet (AS50810) got 10.10.34.36 for vimeo.com from its system resolver. DoH to an outside resolver would have returned Vimeo's real address. On Irancell, though, OONI found connections reset right after the TLS ClientHello, when the site name is sent. That block happens after DNS, so DoH alone leaves the page blocked. Know which layer you are dealing with before you count on DoH.
Sources: RFC 8484 — DNS Queries over HTTPS · OONI measurement: vimeo.com on Mobinnet AS50810, 14 Oct 2026 (DNS answer 10.10.34.36) · OONI — Iran censorship study (2025)
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